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Abstract
The collapse of the Saddam regime in March 2003 saw the publication of a
number of articles or more encompassing works devoted to the situation of the
Christian communities in Iraq.1 The majority of these focus on ecclesiastical issues
and much less on political developments. However, it is clear that it would be artifi-
cial to separate the religious from the political: some religious leaders actively
participate in the political debate and express views on the ethnic profile of their
community, which has consequences for the role they want their communities to
play in the Iraqi society.
The present article tries to describe and understand some political develop-
ments, focusing on three interrelated themes: the divided political landscape, the
position of the Christians in Kurdistan and their relations with the Kurdish Re-
gional Government and the Central Federal Government and the discussion on
political and cultural “autonomy” for the Christian communities and the creation
of a Christian “homeland”.
1) O’Mahony (2004a); O’Mahony (2004b); O’Mahony (2006), esp. 532–532;
Rassam (2006); Suermann (2006); Teule (2008); Teule (2009); Audo (2008);
Winkler (2009); Galletti (2010); Healy (2010); Suermann (2010); Yacoub
(2008); Yacoub (2010).
Several data in this article are based on information acquired during two visits
to Northern Iraq and the Plain of Nineveh (July, 2008, May, 2010) as well as on in-
terviews with Chaldo-Syrian-Assyrian politicians in the diaspora. It is not possible
to mention the names of my informants, whom I would like to thank for their pa-
tience and willingness to answer my questions.
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1. The divided political landscape
Traditionally, Christians in the Middle East define themselves in the
first place according to religious affiliation. This is due to the system in-
herited from the Ottoman times, where the leaders of the religious commu-
nities, as head of the millet, to a certain extent were considered as represent-
ing their people on the national political and societal level. The proliferation
of millets in the 19th century, when each religious denomination became its
own millet, and consequently, each head of a particular Church was given
some political power or influence, contributed to a certain fragmentation of
Christian participation in the political and societal life.2 This system was
certainly modified and adapted to the new political circumstances, when
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, new national states were estab-
lished in the Middle East, and Christians often contributed to the develop-
ment of the idea of a secular nationalism, where religion would play a less
important role in the political sphere. For Iraq, one could think of a certain
Christian participation in the early developments of the Iraqi Communist
Party3 and, in a later period, the secular Baath party.4 From a different per-
spective, the decision of the first government of the Iraqi Kingdom comes to
mind, which expulsed the Assyrian Patriarch when he refused to content
himself with a religious role without civil/political responsibilities in the
newly established Iraqi State.5 Still, Christian participation in political and
societal life often continued to be realized through the religious community.
According to the Constitution of 1924 a number of parliamentary seats were
reserved for the Christian communities. The Chaldean Patriarch Yusif
Ghanima (d. 1958) was personally a member of the Senate and, in a more re-
cent period, the dissident, old-calendarist Church of the East6 was courted
for a certain time by the Saddam regime for its non-ethnic profile, which
suited its policy of Arabization of the country.7
2) For this development, see e. g. Hajjar (1962), 265–267. For the Chaldean and
Assyrian Churches, the most important Christian communities in Iraq, their recog-
nition as millet-s and the role of the patriarchs as millet-head, see Joseph (2000),
57, 59–61.
3) Cf. Batatu (1978), 400–450, 699–701.
4) Valognes (1994), 753–54. O’Mahony (2004b), 30–31.
5) The expulsion of the patriarch happened manu militari near the village of
Semel, north of Dohuk, in Kurdistan and degenerated into the massacre of several
thousands of Assyrian and Chaldeans Christians, cf. Ishow (2002), 199–2006.
6) See infra, appendix.
7) Joseph (2000), 248–249.
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However, the political developments in Kurdistan, the conflict which
opposed the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to the central Government in the
seventies8 and the intensification of the Arabization policy by the Saddam
regime contributed to the creation of a “secular” Christian political party
in Kurdistan in 1979, the Zowa Dimoqratiyya Atoraya (the official Syriac
name; Arabic: al-Haraka al-Dimuqratiyya al-Ashuriyya) or the Assyrian
Democratic Movement (ADM).9 Ideologically, Zowa defended the theory
that the label “Atoraya” (Assyrian) should not be limited to one specific ec-
clesiastical denomination, “the Assyrian Church of the East”, but rather
refers to a distinct non-Arabic and non-Kurdish, Assyrian ethnic and
national identity, interpreted as the continuation of the pre-Christian As-
syrian civilization and shared by the five Churches of Iraq using Syriac as
their literary and ecclesiastical language (the Assyrian Church of the East,
its old-calendarist offspring, the Old Church of the East, the Syriac Ortho-
dox Church and two Uniate Churches, the Chaldean Church and the Syrian
Catholic Church).10 It was an attempt to overcome the traditional ecclesi-
astical divisions, which however continue to play a role in the political
field, as will be seen below.11 This struggle for a distinct ethnic, non-Arabic
identity made ADM a natural ally of the Kurds striving for the recognition
of Kurdish ethnic and political rights. In 1991, with the support of the In-
ternational Community, Kurdistan received a certain form of autonomy,
which allowed for the creation of new political structures such as a Kurdish
Regional Government and a Kurdish Assembly.
The Christian community was richly rewarded for its participation in
the struggle for autonomy. No less than five seats of the new Assembly con-
sisting of 105 seats were allotted to the Christian minority. At the elections
of 1992, Zowa won four of the five Christian seats, the remaining one went
to the “Christian Union of Kurdistan” (Ittihad Masihiyyi Kurdistan),12
represented by Mr Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo, one of the future important
8) For a survey, see Yeldiz (2007), 15–24.
9) Baaba (1992).
10) For those not familiar with the complicated ecclesiastical situation in Iraq,
a brief survey of the different Churches can be found in an appendix to this article.
11) The ideology of an Assyrian ethnic identity common to all Churches using
(or having used) Syriac as literary language was first formulated by the Assyrian
Democratic Organisation (ADO), founded in Syria in 1957. Though mainly present
in Syria and the European Diaspora, ADO is actively involved in Iraqi politics and
cooperates closely with Zowa. On ADO and other “Assyrian” parties/Movements,
see Yonan (1978), 97–109; 129–130.
12) Cf. Yeldiz (2007), 45; McDowall (2005), 381–382.
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Christian politicians of the Kurdish region.13 Since the 100 Kurdish seats
were equally divided between the rivaling Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP) of Masud Barzani (Dohuk-Arbil) and the Patriotic Union of Kur-
distan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani (Sulaymaniyah), the Christian parties were
able to exert a certain influence in the political arena, certainly more than
could be expected on the basis of their numerical presence in Kurdistan.
Zowa was even offered participation in the newly formed Kurdish govern-
ment, where Yonadam Yousef Kanna, one of the founders of the ADM, oc-
cupied the post of Minister of Public Works, Housing and Environment.
Several initiatives were taken to promote the teaching of Modern Syriac, to
publish Modern Syriac periodicals and to support Assyrian cultural so-
cieties.14 A major event was the acceptance (December 1996) – not without
fierce debates – by the Kurdish Parliament of the 7th of August, the remem-
brance of the massacres in Semel, as an official national holiday. According
to some Assyrians, this is the implicit recognition by Kurdish leaders of
the legitimacy of a form of Assyrian nationalism in Kurdish territory. Also
some other Christian Feasts (Christmas, Easter, Ascension) were recog-
nized as official holidays as well as the first of April (Kha b-Nissan), the As-
syrian New Year.
In the period from 1992 to 2003 the official situation virtually re-
mained the same: unchanged Christian representation in the National As-
sembly and several Assyrian ministers in the Kurdish Government. Details
will be discussed in the next paragraph.
After the fall of Saddam, participation in national Iraqi politics again
became an option, a choice made by the Zowa leadership which moved its
headquarters from the North to Baghdad.
In October 2003, the ADM (supported by the Europe-based Assyrian
Democratic Organisation, ADO) took the initiative of bringing together
different Christian politicians as well as representatives of the Churches in
order to discuss a common name for the Christian population instead of
the traditional ecclesiastical appellations.15 Such a common name had be-
come necessary in view of the discussions on the elaboration of a new Con-
stitution, which would contain regulations for the position of the religious
and ethnic minorities of the country. Agreement was reached on the name
Chaldo-Assyrians as a common designation for the Christians of different
denominations. As a concession to the Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Ca-
tholics, who found it difficult to accept the term Chaldo-Assyrian, which
13) Cf. Stansfield (2003), 201–203.
14) Yacoub (1996), 83–89.
15) Cf. N. N. (2003).
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traditionally refers to ecclesiastical communities with whom they had
been in conflict during much of their history, the official name of the lan-
guage of the newly constituted Chaldo-Assyrian community would be-
come Suryani, Syriac, instead of Ashuri, Assyrian. The committee in
charge of the preparation of the new Constitution accepted the new name,
which is found back in article 53d of the Provisional Constitution
(30. 6. 2004), which mentions the “administrative, cultural and political
rights of the Chaldo-Assyrians”.16
Despite this call for unity, the Christians presented themselves at the
national elections for a Constituent Assembly (30. 1. 2005) with three dif-
ferent Christian lists: the National Rafidain List (basically the ADM), the
Assyria National Assembly and the Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party. At the
same time Christians were also offered places on other lists such as the
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, renamed Kurdistan Alliance,
a coalition of mainly KDP and PUK, and the secular Iraqi National List of
Ayad Allawi, eager to attract Christian votes in the Nineveh Governorate,
homeland of an important Christian community (see infra). Of the Chris-
tian lists only the National Rafidain List got the minimum required
number of votes and obtained one seat, which went to Yonadam Kanna,
the former minister in different KRG cabinets. No less than four other
Christians, representing different Christian political or cultural organi-
zations in Kurdistan which had put themselves under the umbrella of the
Kurdistan Alliance such as the Chaldean Democratic Union Party (Gaba
Dimoqrataya d-Äuyyada Kaldanaya, Hizb al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati al-
Kaldani) of Ablahad Afraim Sawa, were also elected, as well as one for the
Iraqi list. Thus, the Constituent Assembly of 275 members counted 6
Christian deputies (among whom Sawa), working for three different politi-
cal factions with divergent views on the relationship of the Christian mi-
nority with the region of the Kurdish regional government (KRG) and the
Central government.
In October 2005, the Assembly approved the text of the new Constitu-
tion. The lack of unity among Christian parties clearly appears from ar-
ticle 121 which replaced article 53d of the Provisional Constitution.17 Ar-
ticle 121 mentions the “administrative (idariyya), political, cultural and
educational rights of the various nationalities (qawmiyyat) such as the
Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians and all other constituents”, restoring the
traditional Christian religious denominational appellations as if the
16) Teule (2008), 158–159.
17) The (Arabic) text of the Iraqi Constitution can conveniently be consulted on
the website of the Iraqi Government, http://www.cabinet.iq (accessed 11. 08. 2010).
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“nationality” or ethnic identity of the Assyrians and Chaldeans would co-
incide with their ecclesiastical affiliation.18
The parliamentary elections of 15 December 2005 for the permanent
Assembly of 275 members offered the same picture.19 Three Christian
Lists, the National Rafidain List, in fact again only the ADM, the list of
the Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party, consisting of a number of small politi-
cal parties and cultural societies, and the Assyrian General Conference
courted the Christian vote, whereas three non-Christian lists, such as the
Kurdistan Alliance, the Iraqi National List and the Iraqi National Dia-
logue Front were also supported by several Christian political parties, so-
cieties or individuals. Of the Christian Coalitions it was again only the
National Rafidain List which managed to reach the electoral threshold
and won one seat (Yonadam Kanna). Two Christians were elected on the
Kurdistan Alliance List, Fawzi Franso Toma Hariri (KDP) and Ablahad
Afraim Sawa for the Chaldean Democratic Union Party, which had joined
the Kurdistan Alliance. Thus, the new Parliament counted three Christian
deputies, representing two ideological tendencies – close cooperation with
the Kurdish region and defending the interests of the KRG on the one side
or playing the card of the Central Government on the other –, which would
divide the Christian political parties during much of the next years.
The Government formed on the basis of these elections had two Chris-
tian Ministers, Mrs Wijdan Mikhail Salim (Human Rights) representing
the Iraqi National List20 and Fawzi Hariri21 for the KDP and the Kurdish
Alliance.
For the parliamentary elections of March 2010, the Christian parties
were confronted with a new situation. The emended election law of 8. 11.
2009 increased the number of parliamentary seats from 275 to 325, five of
18) Though Bishop Shlemon Warduni, patriarchal vicar of Emmanuel Delly,
was in principle against the mentioning of nationalities in the new constitution as
threatening the unity of the country, in case it would be unavoidable to insert a re-
ference to the nationalities into the constitution, he emphasizes that all national-
ities should be mentioned such as the Chaldeans, the Assyrians and the Syriacs.
Apparently, for the Chaldean hierarchy, it was difficult to accept a “trans-denomi-
national” name for the Christians of Iraq. cf. Yacoub (2008), 93.
19) The next paragraphs are based on interviews conducted in Arbil and Dohuk
(July 2008) and on the reporting of the different elections at http://www.anka-
wa.com (Arabic).
20) Till August 2007, when Wijdan Mikhail Salim became Member of Parlia-
ment for the Iraqi National List.
21) Fawzi Hariri, son of the murdered (Christian) KDP governor of Arbil and
also Minister in several KRG-KDP cabinets (see next paragraph).
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which would be reserved for the “Christian Constituent” (mukawwan) to
be added to the number of seats reserved for the governorates of Baghdad,
Nineveh, Kirkuk, Dohuk and Arbil.22 At the ensuing elections (7. 03.
2010), no less than seven Christian Lists and parties (including two inde-
pendent individuals) competed for the favour of the Christian voters, the
most important being the National Rafidain List, again essentially the
Assyrian Democratic Movement of Yonadam Kanna, and the Chaldean
Syriac Assyrian Popular Council List (CSAPC). This Chaldean Syriac
Popular Council, the creation of which will be discussed in the next para-
graph, is closely related to the Kurdish KDP. Thus, with the election of
three deputies for the National Rafidain List (among whom Yonadam
Kanna) and two for the CSAPC-list, the two opposing ideological tenden-
cies continued to divide the Christian Members of Parliament.23
A similar picture is given by the Governorate elections of 2005 and
2009. At the elections of 2005, ADM won one seat in the Governorate of
Niniveh whereas the Assyrian National (or Patriotic) Party (al-Hizb al-
Watani al-Ashuri), a former ally of ADM, but in recent years one of its
strongest opponents, obtained one seat in the Kirkuk Governorate, but
under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Alliance. At the 2009 elections
(31. 1.), the Christian constituent was entitled to one reserved seat in each
of the governorates of Nineveh, Baghdad and Basra.24 For Nineveh, the
Christian seat went to a new party, the “Syriac Independent Gathering
Movement” (Harakat Tajammu al-Suryan al-Mustaqill), which was part
of the Ishtar Patriotic List, backed by the KDP, so that the pro-Kurdish
tendency prevailed in the Nineveh-region, homeland of a great number of
Christians (see infra), at the cost of the National Rafidain List/ADM,
which lost its seat. In the Governorate of Baghdad, the Christian seat went
to the Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party (Gaba Dimoqrataya d-Bet-Nahrayn),
a party with a long history in Kurdish national politics and affiliated with
the Ishtar Patriotic List and KDP, whereas the Basra seat was won by the
Chaldean Democratic Union Party, led by Ablahad Afraim Sawa, who as
seen above also closely cooperates with Kurdish political factions.
22) Alwatan (2009).
23) Three Christian candidates (among whom Mikhail Salim) ran for Prime Min-
ister al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, but were not elected.
24) No elections were held in the governorates of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk
and Arbil, the last two of which have relatively important Christian minorities.
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/2/15 1:56 PM
186 Herman G. B. Teule
2. Christian Politics in Kurdistan
In the previous paragraph we already briefly described the evolution of
the political situation of the Christian minority in the period between
1992, when the first elections of the “independent” Kurdish region took
place, and 2003, the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime.
Despite the initial good cooperation between the different Christian
and Kurdish political parties in 1992 and the results booked by Christian
politicians, one of the problems that appeared difficult to solve was that of
the Christian villages, houses or lands occupied by Kurds, who themselves
had been expelled from their own villages, destroyed during the Anfal
campaigns of 1987–8 or during earlier raids.25 The attacks on Christian in-
stitutions and the assassination of several Assyrians (including the unre-
solved murder of ADM Member of Parliament Francis Shabo in 1993)26 was
also a heavy burden on Kurdish-Christian relations. Still, the cooperation
continued and a number of Assyrian politicians such as Yonadam Yousef
Kanna (ADM), Sarkis Aghajan Mamendo (Christian Union of Kurdistan,
affiliated with KDP), Yonan Hozaya (ADM), Franso Hariri (KDP) and
Yusif Hanna Yusif, known as Abu Hikmet (Independent Labour Party, af-
filiated with KDP27) were offered posts in the different KRG cabinets,
either the united joint KDP-PUK cabinets between 1992 and 1996 or the
KDP-cabinets between 1995 and 2006 after the troubles between KDP
and PUK in 1996.28
In 2004, KDP and PUK decided to end their internal dissensions and
to jointly confront the federal elections of the 31th of January 2005 under
the List of the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (see supra). At
the same date elections were also organized for a new regional Kurdish As-
sembly. In Kurdistan, four Christian factions joined the Kurdish Alliance:
the ADM, the Chaldean Cultural Society, based in Arbil (Ankawa), the Bet-
Nahrain Democratic Party and the Chaldean Democratic Union. The Al-
liance won 104 seats of the Assembly, now consisting of 111 seats instead of
105. Five of these went to the Christian parties, two for ADM, and one for
each of the other factions. The new Cabinet formed on the basis of the elec-
25) See Teule (1995), 146–147. Cf. an internal ADM document (list of Assyrian
villages with a description of the kind of Kurdish aggression) (in Arabic).
26) Galletti (2010), 175–176.
27) See Stansfield (2003), 157–158; cf. United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (2000), 30.
28) Cf. Stansfield (2003), 147, 150, 158. For further precisions, see infra, par. 2
of this article.
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tion results (May 2006) counted three Christian ministers, Nimrod Bayto
(Tourism), Georges Yusif Mansour (NGO’s and Civil Society) and Sarkis
Aghajan Mamendo, as seen above, one of the first Christian politicians to
cooperate with the Kurds, who became Minister of Finance and Vice-Prime
Minister.29
In this capacity and with Kurdish political support he was able to set
up a programme for the construction (or reconstruction) of Christian vil-
lages intended to accommodate Christians expelled by Kurds from their
villages in the North, but especially those Christians fleeing the violence in
the areas under the control of the Federal authorities. This programme
was extremely successful. About 120 villages were built or reconstructed
in the region of Dohuk; several more in the neighbourhood of Zakho or in
the Arbil area. At the same time, Aghajan financed the construction of
churches, schools, orphanages, residences for bishops of all denominations,
including a new patriarchal residence for the Chaldeans in Ankawa,30 se-
minaries and monasteries, for example, the restoration of the famous Mar
Mattai monastery of the Syriac Orthodox. The idea was clearly to suggest
that the future of Iraqi Christianity is in Kurdistan and no longer in cen-
tral Iraq. The result was that since 2006 the number of Christians in the
KRG-region has probably more than doubled and presently consists of
more than 100.000–120.000 persons.
Another important initiative that received the active support (and
the financial means) of Sarkis Aghajan was the creation of the popular
Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Council (mawtba ammaya Kaldaya Soryaya
Atoraya/al-Majlis al-Shabi al-Kaldani al-Suryani al-Ashuri) in March
2007 in Ankawa. The objectives of the Council are among other matters the
unification of the “Chaldean Syriac Assyrian” (CSA) people, promoting
the Syriac language and culture and the establishment of autonomy in the
„historical regions” of the CSA people. The Council, elected in 2007 and
meant to represent all factions of the CSA people, consisted of 21 represen-
tatives from the Iraqi Governorates with Christian minorities (Nineveh,
Dohuk, Arbil, Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Basra). In addition,
29) At the elections for the three governorates in the KRG-region, the Christian
parties did not succeed in winning seats. However, the KDP approved the nomi-
nation of Franso Hariri as governor of Arbil (in office till 1999; cf. Stansfield
(2003), 231; he was murdered in 2001) and of Georgis Shlemon as Deputy Governor
for Dohuk. No governorate elections took place in the KRG region in 2009.
30) In Ankawa, preparations are even being made for the construction of a resi-
dence for the Patriarch of the Church of the East, now residing in Chicago.
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ten seats were reserved for CSA political parties or cultural institutions,31
five seats for the members of the preparatory committee of the conference
and another five for the diaspora.
Despite the enormous response by different layers of the Christian
Iraki population – the first meeting in March 2007 was attended by no less
than 1.200 persons – the initiative failed to bring unity, since the import-
ant ADM refused to participate on account of divergent views on the issue
of autonomy (see next paragraph). As a matter of fact, the Council grad-
ually developed into a political party itself instead of an umbrella organi-
zation and participated, as seen above, in the federal legislative elections of
2009, with the result that a number of parties or societies mostly with an
outspoken Chaldean profile such as the Chaldean National Council decided
to go their own way and left the majlis.
For the parliamentary elections of the 25th of July 2009, five seats (of
111) were explicitly reserved for the Christian minority, thus legalizing the
situation which de facto existed already in the previous Assembly of 2006.
In addition, one seat was reserved for the Armenians, who are present in
several Kurdish towns such as Zakho or villages (Avzrog Armani and the
recently rebuilt village of Hawrezk near Dohuk). Initially, no less than
eight different Assyrian parties signed up to participate. Eventually the
Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party withdrew. The small Assyrian National
(or: Patriotic) Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Ashuri)32 and the Chaldo-
Ashur Communist Party decided to ran jointly under the so-called Chal-
dean Syriac Assyrian Autonomy List. The Chaldean National Council (al-
Majlis al-Qawmi al-Kaldani, Mawtba Umtanaya Kaldanaya) – which def-
ends a distinct Chaldean national or ethnic identity and opposes the in
their eyes artificial CSA appellation defended by the Popular CSA Coun-
cil – formed a new Chaldean United List together with the Chaldean
Democratic Union. The two other Lists participating in the elections were
the CSA Popular Council List and the National Rafidain List (ADM).33 As
was to be expected, the winning seats went to the CSA Popular Council List
(3 seats) and the National Rafidain List-ADM (2 seats). Together with the
seat reserved for the Armenians they make a Christian parliamentary fac-
31) The most important of these were Bet-Nahrain National Union, Bet-
Nahrain Democratic Party, The Chaldean Democratic Minbar, The Syriac Indepen-
dent Gathering Movement, the Chaldean National Council, the Assyrian Patriotic
Party and the Chaldean Cultural Society.
32) Though this party was not elected in the 2005 Kurdish Assembly its leader,
Nimrud Bayto was appointed minister of tourism in the KRG from 2006–2009.
33) Cf. Assyrian International News Agency (2009).
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tion of 6 members. The new Government formed on the basis of the election
results had only one Christian minister (Anwar Jabali Sabo, ADM, Min-
ister of Transport and Communications).
From the above it is clear that the same issue which divides the Chris-
tian politicians on the federal level (relation to Kurdistan and the KRG
government) also plays a role in regional Kurdish Christian politics. In ad-
dition, it has to be mentioned that in certain Chaldean circles there is some
mistrust concerning the true intentions of the KDP/Kurdistan Alliance
who they fear might use Christian votes to strengthen only their own posi-
tion on the federal level. In this respect, they point to the long history of
enmity between Kurds and Christians, even in the recent past, and the fact
that the issue of Christian lands confiscated by the Kurds (see supra) has
not yet been solved. It may be true that many Chaldeans have their origins
in villages situated in Kurdistan and recognize that the housing project of
Sarkis Aghajan has been an answer to the situation of insecurity in Central
Iraq. However, for many of them Arabic has become their first language
due to their long presence in Baghdad or other Arabic cities. They have no
knowledge of the Kurdish languages34 and, because of the uncertainties of
the Kurdish project, do not wish to integrate into the Kurdish society. Fin-
ally, some Chaldeans reject the ideology of the common CSA identity de-
fended by both the Popular Council and the ADM as artificial and not re-
flecting their identity which they feel is distinct from an Assyrian identity,
ecclesiastically, but also ethnically.35
34) The answer of the Popular Council would be that for these Chaldeans it is
perfectly possible to go schools in Kurdistan were Arabic (or even Sureth) is the
main language of instruction. In this respect, provisions have been made exactly for
Chaldeans who have only recently settled in Kurdistan.
35) In this sense, one has to understand the intervention by the Chaldean Patri-
arch Emmanuel Delly asking President Massoud Barzani not to accept the composed
unified name of CSA proposed by the Popular Council for the Constitution of Kur-
distan (http://www.iraqichristians.info/English/Patriarch_EmmanuelDelly_rejects
_FakeName_24_8_2009.htm, accessed 18. 8. 2010). Article 5 of the revised draft
of the Kurdistan Constitution now mentions as non-Kurdish nationalities: the
Turkmen, the Chaldeans, the Assyrians, the Armenians and the Arabs (http://www.
alsabaah.com/paper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=86172. Arabic text,
accessed 18. 8. 2010), mutatis mutandis comparable to article 121 of the Federal
Constitution.
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3. The discussion on autonomy
One of the reasons for the ADM to part ways with the CSA Popular
Council is its different interpretation of the idea of autonomy for the Chris-
tian minority, one of the main objectives of the Council’s programme.36
As seen in the second paragraph, Article 121 of the Federal Constitu-
tion speaks of the “administrative (idariyya), political, cultural and
educational rights of the various nationalities (qawmiyyat) such as the
Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians and all other constituents”. According to
the interpretation of ADM, this article allows for a form of self-adminis-
tration (idara dhatiyya) as a first step to a possibly more complete self-
governance or autonomy in a later stage. Its implementation in the Plain of
Nineveh, homeland (Atra) of an important minority of Christians of differ-
ent denominations, especially the Chaldeans, the Syriac Orthodox and the
Syriac Catholics,37 is one of its core objectives. Various Christian organi-
zations, both in the diaspora as well as in Iraq itself, go a step further and
want full autonomy or self-governance (hukm dhati). Sarkis Aghajan is one
of the most outspoken representatives of this idea. His vision can be found
in a brochure,38 in which he states that, unlike in the case of local self-ad-
ministration, autonomy implies the creation of a Parliament and a Council
of Ministers with legislative or executive powers; the autonomous region
should have full authority, not only in personal matters, but also in issues
of land and soil, which in the case of self-administration remain under the
authority of the competent federal Authority. Autonomy also implies the
right to a fair part of the national budget, not just in the form of subsidies,
as well as their own police and security forces. In personal matters, the
Christians living outside the autonomous region would also fall under its
authority. The CSA Popular Council finds support for Aghajan’s ideas in
Section V of the Constitution, where the articles 112–117 offer the possi-
bility to form new regions with the right to exercise executive, legislative
and judicial powers.39
A second point of divergence between ADM and CSA Popular Council is
the relationship of the envisaged Atra with the Kurdish region. Officially,
the CSA Popular Council holds that it will be left to the inhabitants of the
36) Teule (2009), 53–55.
37) For a description of the most important Christian villages, see Mérigoux
(2000), 213–278.
38) Kako, Interview with Mr Sarkis Aghajan on the Issue of Autonomy (Hukm
dhati) for our Chaldean-Syrian-Assyrian People (in Arabic), [Arbil], 2007.
39) Cf. Yacoub (2010), 153.
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Nineveh Plain themselves to decide about a future relationship with the
Kurdish region. In reality, the politicians of the Council think of strong in-
stitutional bonds with Kurdistan40 and even express the wish that the Atra
should not be limited to the Plain of Nineveh, but should also include a
number of Assyrian villages within Kurdistan itself (e. g. the region of Ber-
wari Bala along the Turkish border, the region around Dohuk, …).41 For
this reason, the Popular Council multiplies its efforts to subsidize housing
projects, cultural and ecclesiastical institutions etc. in the Plain of Nineveh,
officially belonging to the Governorate of Nineveh, outside the KRG-re-
gion, comparable to its policy in Kurdistan itself. In many cases, one has to
recognize that the Council fills the vacuum left by the absence of initiatives
by (or possibilities of) the local authorities, also in matters of security. The
results of the last Governorate Elections for the Governorate of Nineveh,
where the one seat reserved for the Christian constituent went to the KDP-
backed Syriac Independent Gathering Movement/Ishtar Slate at the cost
of the National Rafidain List/ADM which lost its seat (see supra, par. 2),
suggest that the population in the Plain of Nineveh is increasingly in favour
of the Popular Council’s policy. However, several institutions, among which
the Chaldean Democratic Union and ADM, denounce the pressure exerted
by members of the Popular Council on persons who had received allowances
or admittance to its housing programmes, etc..42 Especially the people of
the southern parts of the Plain of Nineveh (Bakhdida and surroundings)
seem to be more in favour of a form of autonomy within the Federal State.
Even the concept of autonomy itself is heavily contested. The most out-
spoken adversary of this idea is probably the Chaldean Archbishop of Kir-
kuk, Mgr Louis Sako. On several occasions he has pointed to the recent and
not so recent history of Iraqi Christianity, characterized by cooperation
and living together with Muslim Arabs43 as well as to the prominent role
40) Cf. The Status of Christians in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. A short Report
by the Kurdistan Regional Government UK Representation. December 2009: http://
www.krg.org/uploads/documents/Status_Christians_Kurdistan_Region_
Dec_09_2009_12_22_h16m26s&6.pdf (accessed 18. 8. 2010)
41) The Council finds support for this possibility in article 35 of the Kurdish
draft Constitution, guaranteeing “national, cultural and administrative rights for
the non-Kurdish nationalities”.
42) Cf. Assyrian Council of Europe (2009; Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization u. Assyrian Council of Europe (2009).
43) This is also the background of L. Sako’s recent book, Christian-Muslim Dia-
logue. Theological Approaches in the Arabic language in the Abbasid Period, Kirkuk,
2009 (in Arabic).
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the Chaldean Church was able to play within the Iraqi society at large. In
his opinion, the Atra risks becoming a sort of ghetto and reducing Chris-
tianity to an ethnic community, preventing Christians witnessing to their
mission in a meaningful way on the national level.44
Concluding Remarks
The recent years have seen the multiplication of Iraqi Christian politi-
cal parties and cultural societies, mostly operating distinctly from the
Churches, which traditionally played the role of representing the Christian
community on the national forum. This development started with the cre-
ation of an autonomous Kurdistan in 1992, but intensified after the col-
lapse of the Saddam regime in 2003. This does not mean that the role of the
Churches is only limited to religious matters. They actively participate in
the debate on ethnic identity. This is shown by the efforts of some members
of the Chaldean hierarchy to oppose the common Chaldean Syrian Assy-
rian appellation defended by the Popular Council. It can also be seen in the
Chaldean opposition to the Chaldo-Assyrian compound-name proposed by
Zowa during its discussions on the place of the Christians in the new Iraqi
constitution. Members of the hierarchies of both the Assyrian and Chal-
dean Churches likewise express themselves on the issue of autonomy and
the creation of a Christian Atra in the plain of Nineveh.
The main division between the Christian political parties is about two
related issues:
1. The question of “autonomy” of the envisaged Atra: should it imply self-ad-
ministration, limited to personal matters, as a first step to more encompas-
sing forms of autonomy, which is the position defended by ADM, or should it
be self-governance with far-reaching political powers for the authorities of
the future Atra, as defended by CSA Popular Council?
2. Should the “autonomous” Atra, situated in the Plain of Nineveh have insti-
tutional bonds with the KRG administration or even be incorporated into
the KRG-region? This is the unambiguous option of the CSA Popular
Council as well as of the Assyrian Autonomy List, but categorically rejected
by ADM and its allies.
44) See, for instance, the brief article by Mgr Louis Sako, Chaldean Archbishop
of Kirkuk, 15. 6. 2007: Sako (2007).
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Appendix: The Christian Communities of Iraq45
The most autochthonous community is the so-called “Assyrian Church
of the East”, which has a long history in Iraq. Its beginnings in Mesopota-
mia – North and Central Iraq – go back to the second century, thus long be-
fore the coming of Islam. In the Abbasid period, the centre of their com-
munity was in Baghdad and their leaders were the privileged interlocutors
of the Islamic authorities; their contribution to the development of Is-
lamic theology and an Islamic culture and civilization in general is widely
acknowledged.46 Due to the vicissitudes of history – especially the grim
period following the incursions of Timur –, of which Muslims, too, were the
victims – these “Assyrians” left central Iraq, withdrew to the region that
today we call Kurdistan, were marginalized and organized themselves
along tribal lines. This meant that, among other things, the functions of ec-
clesiastical and tribal leader merged into each other, a method of organi-
zation that would be even more institutionalized in the Ottoman Empire
(1517–1922), with its millet-system. (How the Assyrians fitted into this
system still has to be studied in greater detail).47 After the first World-War
and the massacres of large groups of Christians in Eastern Anatolia, the re-
mainder of the Assyrians fled to central Iraq, where they had to stay – or
wanted to stay – for various reasons, one of them being the promises made
by the British for some form of autonomy or independence. However,
when, in the thirties of the last century, the new independent Kingdom of
Iraq was founded, their leader was not prepared to give up the secular role
he had played in the traditional society of the Middle East and to restrict
his function to that of a religious leader, which was offered to him by the
newly formed government. For this reason, he and many of his followers
were expelled from the country – this fact is still remembered today by the
members of the community as “martyrs’ day” (on the 7th of August) on ac-
count of the bloody way this expulsion was carried out – and eventually
settled in the United States.48
The Assyrian Church has a strong consciousness of being an ethnic
community. Most of its members express themselves in Sureth, a neo-Ara-
maic language, and, during the liturgical services, it is a point of honour
exclusively to use the old Syriac language (a form of Aramaic) or also
45) This appendix is, with a few adaptations, taken from Teule (2009), 47–50.
46) See e. g. the work of Sako (2009).
47) Joseph (2000), 59–61 cf. supra, par. 1.
48) For general surveys of the history of this community, see Le Coz (1995);
Teule (2008).
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Sureth, but hardly ever Arabic. Assyrian – in Sureth: Atoraya – tradition-
ally designates the land of Ator or the region of Mosul. According to some
modern and relatively recent interpretations, it has received the meaning
of “being in continuity with the old pre-Christian civilization of Assyria”,
of which the Church of the East would be the Christian continuation.49 Ac-
cordingly, their language was also called “Assyrian” (see infra). On account
of this outspoken ethnic position (an Assyrian, not Arabic, identity), a
number of priests fell victim to the politics of Saddam Hussein (Arabi-
zation) in the eighties of the last century.50
In 1968, a rival Assyrian Church was founded in Baghdad. Officially,
the main reason for this step was opposition to certain liturgical reforms
decreed by the Patriarch in Chicago (introduction of the Gregorian calen-
dar). Underlying reasons were traditional tribal dissensions.51 This new
Assyrian Church received the support of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr
and the Iraqi government and later the Saddam regime. Understandably,
therefore, it did not have the label Assyrian in its official name.
In the course of the 17th to 19th centuries, the Assyrians were the object
of intensive missionary activities on the part of the Protestants and the
Catholics. The presence of Catholics eventually led important Assyrian
groups to enter into communion with Rome and brought about the estab-
lishment of a new ecclesiastical community, called the Chaldean Church.
The Chaldeans accepted the authority of the Pope of Rome and the dog-
matic specificities of the Roman Catholic Church but were allowed to keep
a number of “oriental features”, characteristic of the Church of the East,
but unknown in the mainstream Roman Catholic Church, such as a synodi-
cal structure, the traditional East Syrian liturgy and spirituality and its
own Canon Law. Numerically, it is today the most important Christian
community of the country (80 % of the total Christian population). Ethni-
cally, the Chaldean Church has the same distinct identity as the Church of
the East, from which it split.52 Many of its members speak Sureth, whereas
Syriac is their cultural and liturgical language, or at least their language of
reference. However, there is one important difference. Since the creation of
the state of Iraq, the Chaldeans, unlike the majority of the members of the
49) For the sensitive problem of the name Assyrian and the question of ethnic
identity, see Coakley (1992), 147–148; Heinrichs (1993); Joseph (2000), 17–19.
50) Teule (1995), esp. 143.
51) Proche Orient Chrétien 18 (1968), pp. 388–389; 19 (1969), 278–280, 393–394.
52) Some Chaldeans hold that their ethnic identity is different from that of the
Assyrians. This is e. g. the position of the Chaldean National Council (cf. supra, par.
3) and of e. g. the Chaldean Bishop Sarhad Jammo (California).
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Church of the East, have added an Arabic layer to their original ethnic
identity. This was basically the result of the fact that, after World War II,
the majority of their members had moved to central Iraq, Baghdad and of
the ensuing awareness that many Chaldeans had gradually lost the know-
ledge of their native language. This assumed Arabic identity earned them
the sympathy, not only of the leadership of the independent Iraqi State,
but also, in later times, of the Saddam regime, and partly explains the
privileged position the Chaldean Church could occupy within the Iraq of
Saddam Hussein.53
The third (or fourth) indigenous community is that of the Syriac Or-
thodox.54 Though dogmatically, and hence ecclesiastically or denomi-
nationally, entirely different from the Assyrians – in the past, both com-
munities struggled intensively with each other on dogmatic issues55 –, both
communities are the same from an ethnic point of view: they share the
same Syriac language, which is also used by the Syriac Orthodox during
their liturgy and in their literature; the latter also speak Sureth in daily
life. However, their perception of ethnicity is different from that of the As-
syrians. Whereas the Assyrians, as we have seen, put forward the continu-
ity of their language and culture with the pre-Christian Assyrians, many
Syriac Orthodox rather tend to emphasize that their language is Aramaic
and that they are Arameans. In the modern discussions on their identity in
Iraq, they designate themselves as Suryan, their language as Suryânî.
The fourth community consists of a group of Syriac Orthodox who, in
imitation of the Chaldeans, entered into communion with Rome, but main-
tained their former liturgical rites and, of course their ethnic particular-
ities, which are the same as the previous community.56
These are the four or five autochthonous Churches, which, however, do
not cover the whole modern Christian population of Iraq. There is a small
Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholic community, especially in
Baghdad and, until recently, in Mosul. Their presence in Iraq is relatively
recent and goes back to different migration movements in the Ottoman
period and, more recently, to the aftermath of the First World War, when a
number of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia settled in Northern Iraq.
Apart from the latter group, which expresses itself mainly in Badini, the
53) O’Mahony (2004a).
54) A general introduction: Sélis (1988).
55) Cf. For a historical survey and analysis of recent developments, see Brock
(2004).
56) O’Mahony (2006), 515–519.
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Kurmanji language of that region,57 the Armenians have strong ethnic
feelings of belonging to the Armenian community and express themselves
in Armenian. Since the 18th century, there is a small Latin (Roman-Cath-
olic) community, mostly in Baghdad. Their members speak Arabic (or are
foreigners).58 The Anglican and the traditional Protestant Churches are
represented in Baghdad, whereas, since the collapse of the Saddam regime,
American protestant fundamentalist missionaries are active both in Kur-
distan and in central Iraq.
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